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Abstract. As electronic devices become more and more pervasively in-
tegrated in our daily routine, security concerns start to become evident.
In the last years, there has been an increasing interest on the topic of se-
curity in smart environments. One of the most challenging environments
regarding security are smart offices due to the high number of potential
users, devices and spaces, and the diversity of security roles. This paper
presents a security solution for an agent-based architecture for the smart
office. This security solution is potentially applicable to generic smart
environments, but it suits particularly well to the smart office scenario,
taking advantage of the particular characteristics of the environment to
satisfy the security requirements. The result is a hierarchical, agent-based
solution, flexible and scalable enough to be applicable to different smart
office scenarios, from small businesses to large organizations.
1 Introduction
One of the main lines of research in agent technology is using software agents
to automate environment personalization, so that users are released from the
routine tasks they should perform otherwise to change their environment to
suit their preferences and to access to the available services. The goal we seek
is a smart environment, able to adapt itself to the user needs and to provide
customized interfaces to the services available at each moment. To achieve this
goal, we propose to use multi-agent systems, as they have been revealed as good
technology for developing distributed, autonomous, and intelligent systems.
In our previous work [1] we designed and implemented an agent-based soft-
ware architecture for smart homes. We are now extending this architecture to
make it applicable to other smart environments. In particular, we’re interested
in smart office environments, as there are significant challenges in the automati-
zation of such environments derived from their inherent characteristics, like the
high number of potential users or the diversity of potentially available services.
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One of the first challenges we have had to face while shifting from smart
homes to smart offices is the design of the security architecture. In smart home
environments the main goals are user comfort and easy deployment of new de-
vices, so security is usually left apart or focuses mainly in transparency and
privacy enhancement. Office security, however, has more rigorous security re-
quirements, specially if we are dealing with large organizations, where there
may be hundreds, or even thousands, of employees with different access needs
and security clearances. This paper analyzes those requirements and their spe-
cific differences from those of smart homes, and proposes an extension to our
agent-based architecture to provide security services for the smart office.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the most
relevant aspects of the architecture of our smart office, using a typical use case to
illustrate them. Section 3 summarize the key security issues for the smart office
scenario. Section 4 presents our security architecture, describing the function-
ality of the different agents that provide the security services. The last section
summarizes our main contributions and sheds light on some future research.
2 The SETH agent architecture
The security architecture proposed in this document is being deployed over our
platform SETH (Smart EnvironmenT Hierarchy), which is an extension of the
iHAP architecture we developed for smart homes [1]. Detailed description of the
SETH architecture is beyond the scope of this paper, and can be found in [2].
In this section we outline the most relevant characteristics of the architecture as
far as our security proposal is concerned.
Our architecture relies on the concept of smart spaces: specific, self-contained
locations within the environment, which may be hierarchically arranged if the
specific characteristics of the environment requires so. A mandatory device in any
SETH smart space is the Smart Space Agent Platform (SSAP), which contains
the agent platform which supports the existence of all other agents in the smart
space, and hosts the higher level agents of the system.
We may find different kinds of software agents in a typical SETH smart
space. The Smart Space Coordination Agent (SSCA) provides device, service
and context discovery to all other users or agents in the smart space, and to
SSCAs of other smart spaces. Device Agents provide a common interface to
devices, so that other agents in the system may use them regardless of specific
hardware issues. System Agents, like context and security agents, reside in the
SSAP, and add an additional layer of intelligence on top of the devices in the
environment through control and coordination mechanisms. Service Agents are
intended to provide services directly to the user, and they may be persistent, if
they are always active at a given SSAP, and non-persistent ormobile, if they they
are created by the SSCA for each request of the service, move from one SSAP to
another when user location changes, and are destroyed once the use of the service
has concluded. Finally, Personal Agents (PAs) are the very representatives of
users in the environment, able to issue requests to system, service and device
agents on behalf of their associated users.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical service access case in the SETH system. User
Alice enters the presentationRoom smart space. Context agents notify both the
PA and SSCApresentationRoom of this event (1). The personal agent, knowing
that its user is going to make a presentation, asks SSCApresentationRoom for an
agent providing a presentation service (2). No such agent is persistently active in
the SSAP, so SSCApresentationRoom creates an instance of a Non-persistent Pre-
sentation Service Agent (NPPSA) (3) and returns its address to the PA(4). The
personal agent then contacts the NPPSA and requests it to present a slideshow
of a given document stored in the computer at Alice’s deskroom (5). Then the
NPPSA contacts SSCAdeskroom to learn who to ask for the document (6). He is
given the address of a persistent File Transfer Service Agent (FTSA) (7), which
the NPPSA contacts to request the file (8). The FTSA obtains the file from the
device agent (DA) associated to Alice’s desktop computer (9) and transfers it to
the NPPSA (10). Finally, the NPPSA requests the device agent of the projector
in the presentation room to display the slideshow presentation (11).
Fig. 1. Access to services
Any typical interaction such as the described above may involve service dis-
covery requests to different SSAPs, requests to service and device agents, and
even access to resources within the user’s desktop computers. This flexibility of
the interaction mechanism provided by agents greatly improve functionality of
the smart space, but also raises some relevant security concerns that must be
addressed in order to ensure there is no misuse of the provided infrastructure.
3 Security Issues for the Smart Office Scenario
From a functional point of view, security is intended to assess the risks present on
a given environment and to develop safeguards and countermeasures to protect
the environment and its users from those risks [3]. Some of the key services secu-
rity must provide are confidentiality and integrity of interchanged information,
authentication of communicating parties, access control and key management.
Confidentiality is the protection of information in the environment from
unauthorized access. In smart spaces, the term information acquires a unique
perspective [4]. The computer systems involved are potentially capable, as a
whole, of sensing nearly every aspect of interactions between users and the envi-
ronment or among users themselves, and all sensed information has the potential
of being stored, transmitted, queried and replayed. In smart offices, some of this
information will need to be protected due to its business-related sensitivity, but
a great deal of the information sensed by the system will be personal information
about users. Therefore, apart from the confidentiality issues usually present in
information systems, new concerns raise regarding users privacy [5].
Integrity guarantees that only authorized parties are able to modify infor-
mation in the environment, be it by alteration, repetition, removal or delay of
stored information or messages between entities. As with confidentiality, pro-
tection of stored and transmitted information has been traditionally achieved
through cryptographic means. Code integrity must be provided as well, specially
in systems where mobile code is allowed.
Authentication of devices within the smart space can take advantage of ex-
isting approaches for computer and network security. Public or private key cryp-
tography can be used to authenticate information interchanges between devices,
taking into account the considerations about resource limitations stated above.
However, due to the largely decentralized and dynamic nature of smart spaces,
key management is the main problem we encounter when dealing with authenti-
cation in these environments. Solutions that rely on connectivity to an authen-
tication or revocation server, from Kerberos to public-key certificates, can only
be applied to smart spaces where we can assume a hierarchical arrangement of
principals, and where addition and removals of principals in the system may
be controlled. In [6] such a centralized approach is applied to a smart home,
and we will show later its applicability to smart offices as well. In smart spaces
where devices communicate through ad-hoc networks and where devices need to
be added and removed easily secure transient associations are used to provide
authentication in a distributed manner [7].
Access control intends to ensure that only authorized parties are allowed
to perform security-sensitive actions. In smart office scenarios access control
policies may become very complex, due to the different roles played by users in
the office. One solution to model such scenarios is Role-based Access Control [8],
or its extension to take into consideration environmental information defining
environmental roles [9]. Closely related to access control is delegation [10], which
acquire special importance in smart office scenarios.
4 Security Proposal
At the moment no general solution to provide security in smart environments
exists, as the security requirements and trust relationships vary broadly in the
different kinds of scenarios we may deal with. Therefore, each security solutions
must state the assumptions under which it is applicable and the design objec-
tives it pursues. For our agent-based smart office architecture, we assume we
can trust the manufacturer of our core smart office architecture, and that con-
nectivity to a centralized building certificate authority (BCA) is available to the
SSAP associated to each space in the building, so that a chain of trust from
our BCA to the manufacturer of any core service or system agent needed in
the building may be established. This trust assumption may not be extended to
non-persistent service agents (they are mobile) or personal agents (they enforce
user preferences, not system policies). Finally, we assume we can consider the
hosts running each SSAP secure. Such security may be granted through the use
of Trusted Computing [11] or other secure bootstrap techniques [12].
Also, we require our security solution to support the dynamic nature of the
environment (allowing flexible user and device adition and removal), to be scal-
able, to provide reliable authentication and access control to cope with the rigor-
ous security requirements in smart offices, and to support devices with different
capabilities, in terms of power-supply. bandwidth and computing power.
Taking these assumptions and objectives into account, in this section we
present our security proposal for the smart office, describing the approach we
have taken to address each of the security issues we outlined in section 3.
4.1 Message authentication, confidentiality and integrity
As we have seen in section 3, message security is usually provided using cryp-
tographic means. Asymmetric cryptography is known to provide better security
at the cost of more bandwidth and CPU cycles. In our proposal, we assume the
use of asymmetric cryptography is acceptable at the SSAPs and at the personal
devices (PDAs or smart phones) of the users. However, since personal devices are
battery powered, the use of this kind of cryptography should be minimized. Tak-
ing this into account our security architecture uses asymmetric cryptography to
exchange shared secrets between the communicating parties, using a handshake
protocol, which is described in more detail in [2].
4.2 Key Distribution and User Personal Devices
Each SSAP has its own asymmetric key pair, which public key is stored at the
BCA. Whenever a new user is added to the system, key pairs are generated
for use within the building. For users with access to service personalization, an
additional asymmetric key pair is generated for the PA. This allows the system
to distinguish between automated requests and direct requests from the user,
and also allows the system to ask for user confirmation (e.g. a passphrase) when
dealing with sensitive tasks.
4.3 User, Device and Agent Authentication
User authentication is performed by means of certificates. The building must
have its own Building-level Certificate Authority Agent (BCAA) to issue Building-
level Certificates (BCs) for any user entering the building. A BC associate the
user identity to a public key and to a certain number of roles, used to distinguish,
for example, an employee from an unknown visitor. These certificates are used
to authenticate users to the SSCAs whenever they enter a new space.
Each SSAP has its own asymmetric key pair and its own BC. All system
agents and persistent service agents running in the SSAP share this key pair
and can use it to authenticate to users, personal agents and other SSAPs and
to exchange session keys with them as described in section 4.1. As stated at
the beginning of section 4, we assume the SSAP to be secure, and system and
persistent agents are code-signed. These agents are thought as the agents of the
specific space controlled by the SSAP and so we see coherence in making them
share a key associated to that space.
Similar assumptions cannot be made regarding the security of other devices
in the smart space, and thus we consider inappropriate to share the SSAP key
with these devices and the agents controlling them. Furthermore, some of these
devices may not have the computing power, storage space or battery life to put
up with asymmetric cryptography. Therefore we use secret key cryptography to
communicate with these devices, in a way very similar to Resurrecting Duck-
ling [7]. In our architecture, each SSCA shares a secret key with each device in
the space, which allows to create secure transient associations between devices,
user and agents within its associated space by assigning temporary shared secret
keys to pairs of principals.The same approach is used with non-persistent service
agents, since security concerns raised by mobility make sharing the SSAP key
pair with them inacceptable. Figure 2 shows this communication mechanism.
The personal agent request a video-conference service to the SSCA (1), using a
previously agreed session key KS1. After checking the request is legitimate (we
will deal with authorization in the following section), a non-persistent service
agent NPSA is created (2), imprinted to the SSCA by means of a shared secret
key, KS2. Then the SSCA generates a temporary session key for the commu-
nication between the PA and the newly created service agent, KS3, and sends
it securely to both parties (3), which can now communicate using this shared
secret key until it expires (4).
4.4 Authorization and delegation
Once users, devices and agents are authenticated and can establish secure com-
munications among themselves, we use a credential-based approach to provide
authorization services. The basic idea is that users and agents are allowed to
perform an action if they can show a credential signed by a valid authorization
authority. In our system this authority is represented by Smart Space Autho-
rization Agents (SSAA). There is one SSAA for each SSAP, and SSAAs may be
federated to provide a hierarchical tree of authorization agents.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. Secure communication with a non-persistent service agent
There are some additional considerations regarding credential issuing, dis-
tribution and storage. Building-level credentials are usually associated to user
roles, thus implementing a particular form of RBAC [8]. These role based cre-
dentials may be attached to the user building-level certificate, in order to avoid
the burden of having to request an specific credential for each request. There
may be, however, a limitation for credential storage in the user personal devices.
Furthermore, for users not carrying a personal device with enough computing
or storage capability, or for those users not having a Personal Agent acting on
their behalf, the above protocol is not applicable. For these cases, the system
provides an alternative mechanism where the service agents themselves ask the
authorization agents for the user credentials. This will be the typical scenario
for unknown visitors provided with a smart card to access certain spaces of the
building.
Delegation is handled as a particular case of authorization, where the autho-
risation authority which issues a credential to allow a principal A to perform
action X is not an SSAA, but another principal B which is allowed to perform
said action. This allows, for example, a personal agent to issue a credential allow-
ing a service agent (e.g. the agent controlling a presentation display) to access a
file stored at the user’s computer (e.g. to open a slide presentation document).
Both policy definition and certificate and credential management are per-
formed using an agent-based implementation of SPKI [13], as it has been proven
as a reliable public-key infrastructure with a good trade-off between expressive
power for policy and credential definition and computational load.
4.5 Handling agent mobility
The use of mobile agents raises numerous security considerations [14]. At the
moment, our architecture only allows mobility to non-persistent service agents.
These agents are created and started by the SSCA upon request of the services
they provide, thus allowing certain degree of control of what is running in the
SSAP. To increase protection against malicious agents, all non-persistent agents
are code-signed by the manufacturer, whose public key is known to all the SSAPs.
Whenever a mobile agent tries to migrate to another agent platform, the code
signature is verified at the destination to ensure it has not been maliciously
altered. To protect against malicious changes in the state of execution of the
agent, the request upon which the agent has been launched is signed by the
launching SSAP and attached to the migrating agent, so that the destination
platform can restrict what the agent is allowed to do based on the signed request.
Furthermore, whenever an agent migrates, its state is signed by the source SSAP,
thus taking responsibility of the generated state.
As mobile agents may travel through different SSAPs, even through different
buildings, they cannot share the SSAP key as the system and persistent service
agents do. Instead, the SSAP generates temporary symmetric shared keys when-
ever a mobile agent needs to communicate with another principal. Those keys
are revoked if the mobile agent leaves the SSAP.
5 Conclusions and future work
There are vastly different lines of research regarding security in smart envi-
ronments. Though they usually start from the same general assumptions, the
strategies they adopt and the importance they associate to each security issue in
pervasive computing vary greatly, according to the different scenarios they are
intended to deal with. To address the problem of security in a given smart en-
vironment, specific requirements and assumptions imposed by the environment
must be leveraged to determine the most suitable architecture for the solution.
Smart office environments raise significant challenges regarding security, due
to the high number of potential users, devices and spaces, and the diversity of
security roles. They usually have more rigorous security requirements. However,
smart office environments present some characteristics -detailed security policies,
security personnel, policy enforcement among employees- that make possible to
achieve a degree of access control unfeasible in other smart environments. We
have developed a security solution specifically tailored to the smart office sce-
nario, which takes advantage of the particular characteristics of the environment
to satisfy the security requirements.
We believe our solution to be adequately balanced. We have extracted the
advantages of federated solutions for security in pervasive computing like Cer-
berus [15] and distributed solutions like the Resurrected Duckling [7] and put
them together to obtain an hierarchical, agent-based solution which is flexible
and scalable enough to be applicable to different smart office scenarios, ranging
from small businesses to large organizations.
Some issues remain open to further research. We are now implementing new
smart office services in our own workplaces to check if the proposed architecture
is flexible enough to handle them. Mobile agent security is handled in a very
restrictive manner (code signing), and we would like to extend the architecture
to support other forms of protection that allow more flexible introduction of new
services and devices. Tamper-resistance of the devices as suggested by Stajano
should be implemented. Also, we need to address the problem of availability,
which has been left apart in this proposal.
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